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LOPER v. NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT* BEGS THE QUESTION:
IS PANHANDLING PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT?
INTRODUCTION
A homeless man, dressed in tattered clothes so soiled that
it is impossible to discern their original color, walks towards
the southwest corner of Washington Square Park in Greenwich
Village, New York City. His left hand holds a crumpled paper
cup, while his right hand furiously searches his pockets for a
match to light a cigarette he found in the grass. After the man
successfully lights his cigarette, he begins his daily routine. He
innocuously rattles his cup at passersby: "Spare some change?"
This scene is familiar to urban areas and is indicative of a
serious problem that pervades the United States.' There are
* 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
"[P]ersons are classified as homeless if they are living outside conventional
dwellings, either spending nights in shelters for homeless persons or in locations
that are not intended for dwellings and on the street, in abandoned houses, or in
public places such as bus stations or hospital waiting rooms." PETER H. ROSSI,
WITHOUT SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980'S 4 (1989). Although the exact
number of homeless people in the United States is unknown, estimates vary from
250,000 to 3,000,000. John Erickson & Charles Wilhelm, Introduction to HOUSING
THE HOMELESS at xxvi (Jon Erickson & Charles Wilhelm eds., 1986); see also
OFFICE OF POL Y DEV. & RES., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS 8-21
(1984) (reviewing the extent of homelessness in America). This large range is in-
dicative of how little is known about the homeless in the United States and how
certain groups underestimate the seriousness of the problem. Id. at 7.
In January 1983, New York City was housing an average of 4676 homeless
men and 636 homeless women in 18 facilities. 1 HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED
STATES 132 (Jamshid Momeni ed., 1989). By January 1987, that number had in-
creased to almost 9000 homeless men, and 1100 homeless women housed in 28
facilities. Id. The total number of homeless persons in New York State in 1983
was estimated to range between 45,000 and 63,000. Id. Homelessness is more
widespread in New York City than in the rest of the state. New York City esti-
mates that the city's homeless population grew more than 300% between the years
1981 and 1986. Id. In fiscal year 1987, New York City allocated $238.9 million to
remedy the homeless problem. Id. It is interesting to note that the five boroughs
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virtually no major cities in the United States where pedestri-
ans and cars are not confronted with such "panhandlers." In
response to this problem, many states, including New York,
have enacted statutes prohibiting all panhandling in the
streets and other public areas of the city.2 These statutes raise
a critical question about whether a ban on begging' deprives
of New York City, which contain 40% of New York State's total population, con-
tain approximately 85% of the state's total homeless persons.
The racial and ethnic composition of the homeless in New York is an inter-
esting aspect of the overall problem. Although only 13.7% of New York state's
population is African American, over half (55.2%) of the state's homeless persons
are African American. Id. Outside of New York City, the majority of homeless
people are white. In a 1986 study done on the racial composition of homeless
shelters, it was found that of 832 New York City shelter residents, 72% were
African American. Id. It is evident that homelessness affects low-income groups
generally and African Americans in particular. Id.
2 The New York penal law provision states: "A person is guilty of loitering
when he: 1. Loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of
begging . ... " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989).
Other state statutes proscribing begging include California's Penal Code §
647(c), which provides that anyone "[wiho accosts other persons in any public place
or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms is
guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1988).
During the late 1980s, a backlash developed against the homeless. Citizens
and politicians became increasingly frustrated by the government's failure to re-
dress the growing problem. See, e.g., Larry Tye, Seeking Shelter, The Street People
Are Finding Scorn, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1990, at 1 (in cities across the coun-
try there is a backlash against the homeless due to the growing number and in-
creasing assertiveness of the homeless, and a "compassion fatigue" resulting from
the persistence of the homeless problem); see also Nancy R. Gibbs, Begging: To
Give or Not to Give, TIME, Sept. 5, 1988, at 68 (quoting former New York Mayor
Ed Koch's statement that "many people who panhandle just don't want to work
for a living," as indicative of the growing public disdain towards beggars). But see
1 HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 131.
Homelessness is a creeping disease of our times, a disease that is
spreading across our state and across the nation, leaving disruption and
misery in its wake. Each new project, each new bed that we add, re-
stores warmth and continuity to lives that have been drastically altered
by the loss of a home.
Id. (quoting then-New York State Social Services Commissioner Cesar A. Perales)
' The history behind anti-begging statutes is extensive. Beginning in the late
sixteenth century, the goal of anti-begging statutes was to prevent able-bodied
persons from remaining idle. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp.
1029, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). William Blackstone wanted to minimize begging as it
was not good for the economy: "Idleness in any person is also a high offence
against the public economy." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 161, 169
(Univ. of Chicago 1979) (1769). This contemptuous attitude towards begging prolif-
erated during the late seventeenth century.
In both England and the United States, the local governments gave out stiff
penalties to those caught begging. In England for example, then-Commissioner of
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homeless persons of their first amendment right of freedom of
speech.4 Central to this issue is whether begging constitutes
speech.5 Some argue that begging is a form of speech because
it communicates a message about the plight of the homeless.6
Others assert that begging is not protected speech because it
merely conveys the desire to receive money, which traditionally
has not been recognized as protected by the Constitution
These issues have merged in two recent Second Circuit
cases. In Loper v. New York City Police Department,' the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that a statute criminalizing panhan-
dling in the streets of New York violated the First Amend-
ment. This Comment contrasts Loper to the Second Circuit's
decision three years earlier in Young v. New York City Transit
Authority,9 where the court upheld a statute that prohibited
begging in New York City subways." The primary inconsis-
Trade John Locke created a penalty for begging under which all able-bodied men
between the ages of 14 and 50 would be sent to sea under strict discipline for
three years, and all men over 50 years of age or disabled would be sentenced to
three years at hard labor at the House of Correction. MAURICE CRANSTON, JOHN
LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 424-25 (1985). Females over the age of 14 who were caught
begging would be sentenced to three months in the House of Correction, and any
boy or girl under the age of 14 would be "soundly whipped." Id. Moreover, anyone
caught with a counterfeit begging license would be punished by having his ears
cut off. Id.
In 1788, New York State passed a law that classified disorderly persons as
"'all persons who go about from door to door or place themselves in the streets,
highways or passages, to beg in the cities and towns.'" Loper, 802 F. Supp. at
1032 (quoting 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 643 (Weed Parsons 1886)).
' The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' "Speech" can be defined as "communica[tion] and express[ion]; to make
known." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 854 (1980). In Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974), the Supreme Court created a standard to determine whether cer-
tain conduct constitutes "speech." See infra notes 47-52.
6 In Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990), the Legal Action Center for the Homeless, as represen-
tatives of homeless plaintiffs, argued that "whenever a homeless and needy person
is extending his hand, he is communicating" and such communication merits the
protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 150.
In Young, the Second Circuit agreed with this characterization of begging.
The court stated that "[iut seems fair to say that most individuals who beg are not
doing so to convey any social or political message. Rather, they beg to collect
money." 903 F.2d at 153.
8 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
' 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
10 The ban on panhandling states that "[nmo person shall panhandle or beg
upon any facility or conveyance." 21 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 1050.6(b)(2)
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tency between the two decisions is that the court in Loper held
that panhandling is a form of expression that merits first
amendment protection,1 while the court in Young offered no
such protection. 2
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit's constitu-
tional analysis failed to justify the differences between the
facts of Loper and those of Young. As a result, the court has
created two diametrically opposed principles, one that recogniz-
es the expressive element of begging, and one that does not.
Although the Second Circuit's decision in Loper is commend-
able, the Second Circuit must reconcile the conflicting prece-
dent to provide adequate guidance as to what conduct is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
Part I of this Comment explores the underlying goals and
interests of the First Amendment and delineates the standards
courts use to determine whether certain activities should be
protected by the First Amendment. Part II discusses the signif-
icance of Young. Part III then examines the facts and substan-
tive history of Loper. Part IV compares the Second Circuit's
analysis in Loper with the Young decision and focuses on
whether the court in Loper adequately justified its conclusion
that begging is expression that deserves to be protected by the
First Amendment.
I. FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH ANALYSIS
A. General Background
The First Amendment is unique because it is unqualified
on its face." Unlike many of the other amendments included
in the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment is definitive be-
cause it states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech." 4 The distinction between the First
(1985).
"1 999 F.2d at 699.
12 903 F.2d at 146.
"3 "The [First Amendment] is unequivocal and absolute." WILLIAM VAN
ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMjENT 22-23 (1984); see also GER-
ALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (12th ed. 1991) ("As written, the First
Amendment is simple and unqualified.").
'" U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
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Amendment, as opposed to- the Fourth and the Eighth
Amendments, is that the latter amendments provide a quali-
fied limit on governmental activity, whereas the First Amend-
ment is a complete prohibition of the abridgement of speech. 5
This distinction is important because it illustrates that free-
dom of speech analysis should commence with the basic as-
sumption that any regulation of speech is violative of the ex-
press language of the Amendment. 6
15 For example, the scope of the First Amendment is distinct from the Fourth
Amendment, which only protects "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects" against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The First Amendment is also distin-
guishable from the Eighth Amendment, which only proscribes punishment that is
"cruel and unusual." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added); see also VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 13, at 22 (addressing the differences between these amend-
ments). Although one could argue that the difference between the language of the
amendments is merely semantic, a more plausible explanation is that the authors
of the Bill of Rights were particularly concerned about governmental regulation of
speech and sought to limit regulation as much as possible. In the spirit of the
American Revolution against Great Britain, the framers of the Constitution were
especially wary of suppressing dissenting opinions. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1954). Thus, the goal of the drafters of the
First Amendment was "to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further
prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to law-break-
ing, forever impossible in the United States of America." Id. at 21; see also New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding the Sedition Act of 1798,
which banned criticism of the government, unconstitutional). In Sullivan, the Court
stated:
Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. . . . [There
has been] a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it
imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Id. at 276.
16 Any limitation on speech is counter-intuitive to a literal reading of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at
790 (2d ed. 1988) ("Any adverse government action aimed at communicative impact
is presumptively at odds with the first amendment.").
The Supreme Court, in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), stated that the First Amendments prohibition on government
regulation must be taken seriously, and not simply treated as a theoretical ideal.
Id. at 513. The Court stated:
[F]ree speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed
that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would
not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The
Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the
right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly
read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in
1994]
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Although commentators have recognized the unequivocal
nature of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has none-
theless limited the scope of the Free Speech Clause. Inherent
in free speech analysis is the conflict between an individual's
right of free speech and society's interest in protecting itself
from potential danger created by the exercise of that right. Ad-
dressing this conflict in Schenck v. United States,'7 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that the question in every
free speech case is "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.""s In balancing the "evil"
created by the speech against the interests of the speaker or
actor, courts face an onerous task since it may be impossible to
"rank all possible evils" associated with certain conduct. 9
carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the permissible
exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four
corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a
school classroom.
Id.
I17 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Schenck, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to obstruct the draft in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917. The defendants
had distributed a circular that argued that the draft was unconstitutional and
urged individuals to exercise their "right to assert [their] opposition to the draft."
Id. at 51. The Court determined that the convictions did not violate the First
Amendment since the words created a "clear and present danger" of obstructing
the war effort. Id. at 52.
" Id. at 52. Holmes stated that one who falsely yells "Fire!" in a crowded
theater creates a great risk of panicking the crowd, and thus such speech is not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. Schenck is now used by courts as a tool to
measure whether certain speech is protected by the First Amendment.
In Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919), a case decided one
week after Schenck, Justice Holmes sought to explain the intent of the drafters of
the First Amendment, and stated that:
[T]he First Amendment ... obviously was not, intended to give immuni-
ty for every possible use of language .... We venture to believe that
neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or
later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a mur-
der . ..would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech.
Id. at 206.
Judge Learned Hand addressed the difficult balance between these two inter-
ests. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (upholding the con-
victions of members of the National Board of the Communist Party for conspiracy
to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). In his opinion, Judge Hand stated that "[in each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 212.
19 VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 13, at 30. The drafters of the Bill of Rights indi-
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B. Interests Promoted by the First Amendment
The First Amendment is based on the premise that the
United States, as a free and democratic society, allows individ-
uals to have independent ideas and opinions which neither the
government nor other individuals have the right to control,
censor or regulate.0 Courts consider three factors in analyz-
ing whether a certain activity deserves first amendment pro-
tection. These factors are whether the activity in question pro-
motes: the enlightenment of society, the democratic system or
self-actualization.2 The Supreme Court uses these three fac-
rectly gave the judiciary authority to deprive people of their constitutional right of
free speech. The authority was based on a courts' conception of the "evil" that
might result from certain conduct. This investment of power also "implicitly directs
the courts to render a determination of what legislatures are constitutionally em-
powered to define as evil for purposes of criminalizing speech likely to produce
that evil." Id. The more "evil" that the conduct creates, the more likely courts will
uphold the regulation. Id.
" John Stuart Mill was one of the first scholars who addressed the notion that
an individual's thoughts should be free from governmental intervention. Mill stated
that:
No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a
legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to
prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what argu-
ments they shall be allowed to hear.... If all mankind minus one, were
of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, man-
kind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
John S. Mill, On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 37-38 (Haig A. Bosmajian ed., 1971).
21 See, e.g., Professor Gunther discusses several themes that pervade First
Amendment jurisprudence. Gunther states that "[Olne emphasizes the value of free
speech in promoting individual self-expression and self-realization; the other stress-
es the value of freedom of expression for a system of ... self-government."
GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 998; see also THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
Professor Tribe emphasizes that it is essential for an individual to have the
opportunity to convey ideas, no matter how repugnant to others. TRIBE, supra note
16, at 785. He further contends that the "first amendment [is] essential to intel-
ligent self-government in a democratic system." Id. Lastly, Professor Tribe ac-
knowledges the very personal and private interest that individuals have in the
First Amendment. Id.
Justice Brandeis delineated the primary concerns and goals of the First
Amendment:
Those who won our independence . . . valued liberty both as an end and
as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and cour-
age to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the dis-
1994]
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tors as a guide in determining the constitutionality of govern-
mental regulations that purportedly suppress free speech.
The first factor courts consider is the interest in the en-
lightenment of society. This interest stems from the belief that
society should be a "market place of ideas;" individuals are
exposed to as many ideas and interpretations as possible so
that they may benefit from the free exchange of information.22
Enlightenment is founded on the notion that a person is only
able to achieve truth if exposed to a wide variety of ideas and
information." Justice Holmes introduced the "market place of
ideas" concept to first amendment jurisprudence in his dissent
in Abrams v. United States,' where he stated that "the best
test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market."" This concept suggests that if
individuals are able to freely debate and exchange ideas with
one another, they will discover the most efficient way to solve
societal problems. Thus Justice Holmes emphasized that the
principle of free thought and speech is a salient foundation of
the Constitution and that it is "not free thought for those who
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."26
covery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assem-
bly discussion would be futile; that with them discussion affords ordinari-
ly adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government; ... that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; . . . .Rec-
ognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended
the Constitution so that free speech... should be guaranteed.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Integral to the idea of personal satisfaction is the importance of protecting
expression, which does not necessarily involve speaking. For example, although a
person may beg without speaking, the beggar may derive satisfaction out of the
ability to express her anger and frustration. Without this freedom, the beggar is
left with no avenue to convey her thoughts and feelings about her situation. See
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
22 TRIBE, supra note 16, at 785-86.
' "One of the most important purposes of society and government is the dis-
covery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only
through absolutely unlimited discussion . . . ." CHAFEE JR., supra note 15, at 31;
see also TRIBE, supra note 16, at 785-88.
24 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also infra note 50.
25 Id. at 630.
26 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissent-
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The second factor that courts examine is whether or not
the activity in question promotes and enhances the democratic
system." The drafters of the First Amendment encouraged all
individuals to participate in the political process to ensure that
varied interests were protected, not just those of the educated
and upper classes. Alexander Meiklejohn, the architect of the
"democratic governance" theory, contends that free speech
must be protected by the First Amendment to guarantee intel-
ligent self-government in a democratic system." The Supreme
Court, applying such a theory in Cohen v. California,29 held
that:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discus-
sion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom
will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with
the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests."0
Implicit in this democratic concept is the assumption that
individuals should be free to criticize the government's
strengths and weaknesses. Judge Learned Hand expressed this
idea, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,"' as "the right to
2 A democracy is defined as a "government in which supreme power is vested
in the people and exercised by them or their elected representatives." RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 242.
2 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERN-
MENT 27 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948). Meiklejohn stressed the importance of
different members of society meeting to discuss and express their political ideas
with one another, no matter how different and conflicting those ideas may be. Id.
at 55. He also emphasized that the United States is founded on the principle of
self-government, where all individuals must be equally represented in the govern-
ment to ensure that the government is truly run by the people. Meiklejohn stated
that:
The primary social fact which blocks and hinders the success of our ex-
periment in self-government is that our citizens are not educated for self-
government. We are terrified by ideas, rather than challenged and stimu-
lated by them. Our dominant mood is not the courage of people who
dare to think. It is the timidity of those who fear and hate whenever
conventions are questioned.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM 256 (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed.,
1981) [hereinafter TEACHER OF FREEDOM].
29 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3' Id. at 24.
3' 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) (the production of a monthly revolutionary journal did
1994]
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criticize either by temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and
indecent invective." That right, he posited, is "the privilege of
the individual in countries dependent upon the free expression
of opinion as the ultimate source of authority."32
The third factor courts use to guide their first amendment
analysis is the promotion of self-realization (or self-actualiza-
tion). This is defined as the human need to express oneself and
to be recognized by others."3 The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that the First Amendment is crucial to human develop-
ment because, if individuals are unable to express themselves,
their intellectual, social and personal growth will be stunt-
ed. 4 The Supreme Court explicitly has held that self-realiza-
tion, which is based upon the "premise of individual dignity
and choice," 5 is a vital interest promoted by the First Amend-
ment.
C. What Conduct Constitutes Speech?
Despite the unequivocal nature of the Free Speech Clause,
courts considering the three factors discussed above have de-
veloped a myriad of tests, standards and criteria to determine
what types of conduct are protected.36 As a result, speech
analysis has been widely criticized as a "hodgepodge of catego-
not violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
32 Id. at 539.
"' Self-realization refers to 'either [the] development of the individual's powers
and abilities-an individual 'realizes' his or her full potential-or to the
individual's control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting deci-
sion-an individual 'realizes' the goals in life that he or she has set." Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
The Court has further recognized the importance of free speech to an
individual's sense of self-worth and has noted that 'a [human] spirit that demands
self-expression ... [fulfills] the basic human desire for recognition." Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
'4 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 427. Justice Marshall concluded that:
Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a
sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human
desire for recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity ...
Such restraint may be 'the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free
and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.'
Id. at 427-28 (quoting John Milton, AREOPAGITICA 21 (Everyman's ed. 1927)
(1644)).
" Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 13, at 21.
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ries and tests... [and] ... semantic distinctions and artificial
rubrics." 7 It is, therefore, imperative to analyze the relevant
tests and standards applied by courts to determine whether
the Second Circuit's invalidation of section 240.35(1) of New
York's Penal Law was proper."
When analyzing conduct, courts must first consider wheth-
er the act in question is sufficiently expressive so as to consti-
tute "speech." The First Amendment does not contain an ap-
pendix that "authoritatively lists the varieties of speech within
and without 'the' freedom of speech." 9 The leading case that
guides courts in determining whether conduct is "speech" for
the purposes of the First Amendment is Spence v. Washing-
ton."° In Spence, a college student hung a privately owned
American flag, with a peace symbol taped to it, outside his
window.4' The Court framed the issue as whether the
student's activity was "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments."42
The Spence Court concluded that displaying an American
flag with a peace symbol attached to it was conduct protected
by the First Amendment.43 The Court reasoned that the ex-
" Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
" Loper, 999 F.2d at 706. Part II will explore only those tests pertaining to
governmental regulations of expressive conduct. Part II will also examine the in-
terests that the First Amendment seeks to promote. This is an integral component
of an examination of first amendment analysis because it is necessary to under-
stand why certain tests advocate the protection of certain interests, but not others.
" VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 13, at 26.
40 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See generally Stephanie M. Kaufman, The
Speech/Conduct Distinction and First Amendment Protection of Begging in Sub-
ways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803, 1813-26 (1991).
'" The student claimed that he had hung the flag as a means of expressing his
opinion that the United States stood for peace, despite its invasion of Cambodia
and the Kent State incident. The student was convicted under a Washington State
flag-misuse statute, which prohibited the exhibition of an American flag that had
figures, symbols or drawings placed on it. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86.020
(West 1988); see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 406-07.
42 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 414-15. The Court cited to its decision in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the Court stated that "[wie cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Id. at
376. It was necessary for the Court to create a mechanism to separate those activ-
ities that the First Amendment did *protect from those that it did not. See supra
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pression of an idea through activity or conduct is protected by
the First Amendment if the actor or speaker intends to convey
a particularized message and the likelihood is great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.' In
Spence, the Court found that these two requirements were
satisfied: the college student was trying to convey the message
that he believed that the United States stood for peace, despite
recent political turmoil, and "his message was direct [and]
likely to be understood."45 The Spence decision is central to
the development of free speech jurisprudence because it provid-
ed first amendment protection to certain conduct, unaccompa-
nied by words, that expressed an idea.
D. Content-Neutral v. Content-Based Regulations
There are two types of governmental regulation of
speech.46 The first type, called "content-based regulation,"47
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
" Spence, 418 U.S. at 411. The Court acknowledged the state's argument that
there was a risk that those who viewed the flag would not understand that it
stood for peace. The Court stated, however, that it was constitutional for people to
have different views of what the American flag symbolized. "[The flag] evidenc-
es . . . unity and diversity.. . . [and] carries in varying degrees a different mes-
sage. 'A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one
man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.'" 418 U.S. at 413 (quot-
ing West Virginia State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943)).
Some skeptics hold that an activity that does not involve actual words cannot
constitute "speech," and therefore question whether such activity should merit first
amendment protection. Spence refutes this skepticism. See also Clark v. Communi-
ty For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (sleeping in a national
park to protest the country's homeless policies is expressive conduct protected to
some extent by the First Amendment).
Other non-vocal activities that the Supreme Court has recognized as expres-
sive conduct meriting First Amendment protection include: the burning of a United
States flag by a protestor during a political march at the Republican National
Convention, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); the wearing of black arm-
bands by school students on certain days to protest the Vietnam war, Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969); and a silent
sit-in protesting a library's segregation policy. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
141-42 (1966).
'5 Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
46 See generally TRIBE, supra note 16, at 789-94.
' TRIBE, supra note 16, at 790. An example is a prohibition against any criti-
cism of the government. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(holding the Sedition Act of 1798, proscribing criticism of the government, uncon-
stitutional).
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is directed at a particular activity that involves a message that
the government disapproves of and seeks to suppress. The
second type, called "content-neutral regulation,"4" is directed
at furthering certain goals unrelated to the speech, such that
the limit on speech is only incidental. Although a content-neu-
tral regulation does not target the actual message, it may have
an adverse effect on an individual's ability to communicate
ideas.
Content-based and content-neutral regulations are subject
to different levels of scrutiny. Most content-based regulations
are presumed to be violative of the First Amendment.49 The
Court has held that if a government regulation is content-
based, the government "must show that [the regulation] is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."" To uphold a content-
"' TRIBE, supra note 16, at 789-90. An example of a content-neutral regulation
is a government ban against loudspeakers in residential areas. See Kovacs v. Coo-
per, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (a prohibition of loudspeakers was constitutional since the
state had a compelling interest, unrelated to the suppression of speech, in protect-
ing the neighborhood from loud and boisterous noise).
'" Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (presumption of invalidity of
regulations aimed at speech content); see also TRIBE, supra note 16, at 790.
The Court has emphasized that the goal of the First Amendment is to ensure
that the "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted) (an ordinance prohibiting all picketing, except
by those involved in a labor dispute, was unconstitutional since it excluded certain
picketers based on the message they conveyed to the public).
The Court generally is skeptical of regulations that prohibit unconventional or
bizarre ideas. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989) (overturning the conviction of a man who burned the American
flag as part of a protest at the Republican National Convention since the Texas
statute was aimed at the message the activity conveyed and the state's interest in
preventing breaches of peace did not justify the conviction).
" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
In Abrams, the Court affirmed the convictions of five Bolshevik sympathizers for
violating the 1918 amendments of the Espionage Act that made it an offense to
encourage people to protest against the war with Germany. Id. at 616. Abrams
and several others threw leaflets (that denounced United States intervention in
the Russian Revolution) out of a window, and urged people to protest U.S. ship-
ments to anti-Soviet forces. The government argued that the pamphlets incited
people to protest the war and, by lowering morale and support for the war, cre-
ated the potential for defeat. Id. Applying the rationale used in Schenck, the Court
upheld Abrams's conviction. Id. at 618. The Court conceded that the Espionage Act
limited individuals' ability to express dissent towards the war effort, but agreed
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based regulation, the Court requires a very close relationship
between the state interest-the end goal-and the regula-
tion-the means to that end. It is probable that a content-
based regulation will be struck down if it "unnecessarily
[reaches] expressive conduct."5'
To determine the constitutionality of a content-based regu-
lation, the Court also examines whether an alternative means
for furthering the state's interest exists.52 For instance, if the
state's interest could be furthered by dialogue between oppos-
ing parties, rather than by a regulation that suppresses
speech, the Court will strike the regulation as an unnecessary
abridgment of free speech.53 Moreover, the government cannot
justify a content-based regulation by asserting that the mes-
sage conveyed had been voiced already by other speakers or
that the same message can be communicated in another time,
place or manner.54 Because the Court fears governmental con-
with the government that its interest in protecting the war effort was sufficiently
compelling to justify this restraint on speech. Id. at 616.
In his dissent, Justice Holmes argued that the defendants' conviction should
be overturned since there was no proof of actual intent to defeat the American
war effort against Germany. There was only proof of Abrams's intent to help Rus-
sia and stop American intervention in the Russian Revolution. Indeed, Justice
Holmes's vehement dissent in Abrams is praised as an eloquent exposition of the
philosophical meaning of the First Amendment. Holmes emphasized the signifi-
cance of the individual's freedom to exchange ideas with others and concluded that
only "the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about" will
justify regulating speech. Id. at 628. Justice Holmes stated: "In this case sentences
of twenty years imprisonment have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets
that I believe the defendants had as much right to publish as the Government
has to publish the Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them."
Id. at 629.
" TRIBE, supra note 16, at 833; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating a public service commission order
that prohibited a utility from including an insert in monthly billing envelopes that
discussed controversial issues of public policy). In Consolidated Edison, the Court
required the government to illustrate that the regulation was "a precisely drawn
means of serving a compelling state interest." Id. at 540; see also Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down a state university regulation that pro-
hibited a religious student group from using university facilities because the uni-
versity failed to show that the regulation was necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it was narrowly drawn to achieve that end).
52 TRIBE, supra note 16, at 833-34.
STRIBE, supra note 16, at 834; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Justice Brandeis reasoned: "If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
" In determining whether a regulation is violative of the First Amendment, it
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trol of the public's thought processes, content-based regulations
are undoubtedly more difficult for the government to justify
than content-neutral regulations.55
When analyzing the constitutionality of a content-neutral
regulation, the court balances the state's interest in regulating
the activity against the degree to which the regulation affects
an individual's freedom of speech.56 In United States v.
O'Brien,57 the Supreme Court created a four-factor test to de-
is irrelevant whether other means of communicating the same idea exist. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 541 n.10 ("[W]e have consistently rejected the
suggestion that a government may justify a content-based prohibition by showing
that speakers have alternative means of expression."); see also Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976)
(invalidating state ban on advertising of prescription drug prices); Spence v. Wash-
ington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (rejecting argument that availability of other
means for students to express similar ideas made any suppression of their speech
"miniscule and trifling"). But cf. Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903
F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (a total ban of begging in the subways was constitutional
since beggars had the alternative means of begging in the streets).
" See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) (if content-based regulations were not subject to
a higher standard of review, the Court would be "effectively excising a specific
message from public debate ... [and] mutilat[ing] the thinking process of the
community").
This distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations has
been widely criticized by those who argue that any type of government regulation
on free speech should be subjected to a fairly high level of scrutiny. For example,
Martin Redish argues that "[wihile governmental attempts to regulate the content
of expression undoubtedly deserve strict judicial review, it does not logically follow
that equally serious threats to first amendment freedoms cannot derive from re-
strictions imposed to regulate expression in a manner unrelated to content." Mar-
tin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 150 (1981). Redish asserts that every governmental regulation of expres-
sion should be subjected to a "unified compelling interest analysis." Id.
"6 Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Tribe
notes that:
even a wholly neutral government regulation or policy, aimed entirely at
harms unconnected with the content of any communication, may be inval-
id if it leaves too little breathing space for communicative activity, or
leaves people with too little access to channels of communication, whether
as would-be-speakers or as would-be-listeners.
TRIBE, supra note 16, at 978.
67 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the defendant was convicted after he inten-
tionally burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. O'Brien was convicted
under a statute that punished anyone who "forges, alters, knowingly destroys,
knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such [draft card]." Id. at 370
(quoting Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)
app. (1948)). O'Brien argued that the statute violated his first amendment right to
express his views about the draft and the war. O'Brien candidly told the jury that
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
termine the constitutionality of a content-neutral regulation.
To be upheld as a content-neutral, the regulation must be
within the constitutional power of the Government; it must
further an important or substantial governmental interest; it
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression;58 and
it must have an incidental restriction on first amendment free-
doms that is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.59
The O'Brien Court held that conduct having only some
expressive elements did not necessarily merit the full protec-
tion of the First Amendment and may be subject to govern-
mental regulation. ° Where the expressive conduct involved
he burned his draft card in an effort to influence the public's opinion towards the
war and had hoped that through his activity others would adopt his anti-war be-
liefs. Id. at 370.
8 A regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free expression if the
regulation's goal is not to stifle the message that the speech conveys and the
suppression of the speech is incidental to the primary goal of the regulation.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
"' O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court in O'Brien characterized the statute as
content-neutral and emphasized that the suppression of O'Brien's speech was inci-
dental since the state's real motive was to protect the draft. Cf. NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 78-79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (statute
proscribing picketing of stores violated the First Amendment since the statute did
not further any governmental interest and was aimed solely at the particular
views of the picketers); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (striking
down a statute that prohibited people from displaying any "flag, badge, banner, or
device" to express their opposition to organized government).
In contrast to O'Brien, the Court in Stromberg characterized the statute as
content-based because the government's interest was in fact to prohibit the com-
municative nature of the conduct. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 368. The Court held that
the statute was "aimed at suppressing communication," and thus could not be
"sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382
(discussing Stromberg).
Professor Tribe disagrees with the Supreme Court's characterization of the
statute in O'Brien as content-neutral. TRIE, supra note 16, at 823. Tribe is skep-
tical as to whether the government's true motive in constructing the statute was
to ensure the smooth and successful running of the Selective Service, and argues
that the real motive behind the statute was to stifle any dissent against the war.
He states that "the publicly visible evidence quite clearly shows that the [statute]
would not have been enacted but for the purpose of suppressing dissent." TRIBE,
supra note 16, at 823-25.
'0 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Court held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. The Court further stated: "[Elven
on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow
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the burning of draft cards, the Court found the regulation
proper pursuant to Congress's power to raise and support ar-
mies and to create laws that are necessary and proper to
achieve that end.6' Moreover, the Court determined that the
government has a substantial interest in the prevention of the
destruction of draft cards since it is vital for the country to
have a "system for raising armies that functions with maxi-
mum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding
to continually changing circumstances."62 The statute also sat-
isfied the third prong of the test since the goal of the regula-
tion was unrelated to the suppression of O'Brien's free speech.
The Court concluded that:
both the governmental interest and the operation of [the statute] are
limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. The
governmental interest and the [statute] are limited to preventing
harm to the smooth and efficient finctioning of the Selective Service
System.... For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and
for nothing else, he was convicted.63
Finally, the Court held that the statute was constitutional
since it did not place any restriction on first amendment free-
doms.
The Court expanded the four-factor O'Brien test in Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence." In Clark, the Court
held that a content-neutral regulation of oral and written ex-
pression is subject to reasonable time, place and manner re-
that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activ-
ity." Id.
61 Id. at 377 (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948)).
62 Id. at 381.
63Id. at 381-82.
64 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Clark involved a National Park Service regulation that
prohibited a group that included homeless people from sleeping in Washington
D.C.'s Lafayette Park and Mall prior to a demonstration. The demonstration was
intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless. Homeless people asserted
that they would only participate in the demonstration if they could sleep in the
park and Mall the night before. The ban was a clear limitation on the manner in
which the protesters could demonstrate. The government argued that it had a
legitimate interest in insuring that the parks were adequately protected and re-
mained in an intact condition for the millions of people who visit Washington D.C.
Id. at 296. The government also contended that if the protesters slept in the park
and the Mall it would impede government efforts to keep these areas clean. Id.
Although the Court determined that sleeping in the park was expressive conduct
within the meaning of the First Amendment, the Court held that such a finding
was not in itself sufficient to warrant first amendment protection. Id. at 293.
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strictions as long as the regulation is narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest.65 The Court has
interpreted "narrowly tailored" to mean that the governmental
interest must be served by means that are substantially less
intrusive of speech interests." The regulation still may be
constitutional, however, even if it is not the least-restrictive
means available to fulfill the governmental interest. Such
regulations also must provide ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.68
'" Courts usually require a showing by the government that its interest is
substantial and worthy of infringing any expressive element of the conduct. Profes-
sor Tribe argues: "However neutral their intention with respect to speakers and
messages, [content-neutral regulations'] impact is anything but neutral, and gov-
ernment must therefore go a substantial distance to justify enforcing them." TRIBE,
supra note 16, at 979-80.
66 Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. The Court in Clark stated that it was "unmoved by
the Court of Appeals' view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and
hence invalid, because there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have
satisfied the Government interest in preserving park lands." Id.
17 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (municipal noise
regulation designed to ensure that musical performances at public concert stage
did not disturb surrounding residents was a "content-neutral" time, place or man-
ner regulation). The Court in Ward stated:
[A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . need
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of [serving the
government's interest]. Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is sat-
isfied "so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion," . . . [and] the means chosen are not substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government's interest.
Id. at 798-800 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
6' 468 U.S. at 293. The Court in Clark held that the ban on sleeping in the
park did not violate the First Amendment. First, the Court determined that the
ban was content-neutral because it was not aimed at the message conveyed by
sleeping in the parks. Id. at 295. The Court noted that the ban narrowly focused
on the government's substantial interest in maintaining the safety of these areas
since it did not enjoin the actual demonstration. This buttressed the government's
argument that the regulation was not directed to suppress any message that
homelessness carries with it. The Court also stated that, despite the ban, the
"intended message concerning the plight of the homeless" still could be delivered
to the media and the public-through the use of signs, the presence of protestors
on a day-and-night vigil, and through the erection of two symbolic tent cities. Id.
Similarly, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983), the Court held that the First Amendment was not violated when a
union, which had been elected by public school teachers as its exclusive bargaining
representative, was granted access to the interschool mail system while access was
denied to a rival union. Id. at 44. The rival union argued that its right of freedom
of speech was denied since it could not communicate to the teachers via the
school's mail facilities.
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E. Offensive Speech is not Precluded from First Amendment
Protection
The Court consistently has held that certain conduct can-
not be regulated or prohibited just because a distasteful mes-
sage is associated with such conduct.69 That is, once expres-
sive conduct is deemed protected by the First Aniendment, it is
irrelevant whether the message integral to the activity is offen-
sive to members of society.7" In Cohen v. California,7 the
Court analyzed the extent to which society at large should be
protected from messages that might be considered distasteful.
The Cohen Court overturned the defendant's conviction for dis-
turbing the peace after he had walked into a courthouse wear-
ing a jacket with the phrase "Fuck the Draft" printed on it.72
The Court analyzed the collective-bargaining agreement in the context of a
governmental regulation since the agreement was between the Board of Educa-
tion-an arm of the government-and the union. The Court upheld the regulation
as a reasonable time, place and manner regulation because the exclusion of the
rival union served the compelling state interest of ensuring exclusive and adequate
representation by the elected union, and there were substantial alternative chan-
nels that were available to the rival union, such as bulletin boards. Id. at 46-53;
see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning
ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theatres from locating within 1000
feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or
school, since the city had a substantial interest in addressing the problems created
by adult theaters).
The standard created by the Court in Clark is similar to the standard set out
in O'Brien in that both sanction content-neutral regulations of speech, provided
that they are narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest that
is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. The Court in Clark noted the ban
on sleeping was also sustainable under the O'Brien four-factor standard, and stat-
ed that there is little if any difference between the O'Brien standard and the stan-
dard applied to time, place and manner restrictions. Clark, 468 U.S at 298.
"' See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (flag desecration is
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).
70 TRIBE, supra note 16, at 940. Tribe states that "[the] presumption of the
equality of ideas is a corollary of the basic requirement that the government may
not aim at the communicative impact of expressive conduct." Id. at 940-41.
71 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
72 The Court held that Cohen's conduct was protected by the First Amendment
since he wore the jacket to express his animosity about the Vietnam war and the
draft. The state argued that Cohen's conduct should be prohibited since his behav-
ior had a tendency to provoke others to act violently or to disturb the peace. Id.
at 16-17. The state also contended that the people within the courthouse, including
young children, should not be forced to view the message on Cohen's jacket. The
Court rejected these arguments and stated that when individuals leave the privacy
of the home they take the risk of exposing themselves to unpleasant messages and
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The Court created a standard to determine when particular
conduct or a message is so repugnant that the government has
a right to regulate or prohibit it. Before the government can
regulate certain distasteful speech, the government must show
that "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner" by the distasteful speech. "Any
broader view ... would effectively empower a majority to si-
lence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilec-
tions."73
In Cohen, the Court was particularly concerned with regu-
lations that silenced expression solely on the basis of the un-
conventional or unusual nature of the message. The Court
emphasized that one of the tenets of the Constitution is "'the
right to criticize public men and measures-and that means
not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation."'74 The Court recog-
ideas. Id. at 20-21.
The Court concluded that although some people in the courthouse may have
been offended by Cohen's message, these people "could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. The state's
interest in protecting people from unpleasant messages did not justify curbing
Cohen's right to express his views towards the war. See also Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) ("public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers"); cf.
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)
(the government may "protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain
methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance").
" Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. The Court noted: "While the particular four-letter
word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its gen-
re, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at
25. Since there was no evidence that Cohen's jacket incited people to violence, the
state could not justify Cohen's conviction by claiming that the suppression was
necessary to curtail public violence.
One year later the Court followed the reasoning of Cohen in Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the defendant was convicted for
picketing near a school. The picketing consisted of simply holding a sign protesting
discrimination against blacks. A city ordinance proscribed picketing within 150 feet
of a school during school hours, unless the peaceful picketing involved a labor dis-
pute. The Court held that the ordinance discriminated against certain picketers,
such as the defendant, since it allowed certain messages to be voiced, while pro-
hibiting others. Id. at 95-96.
Consistent with it's reasoning in Cohen and Mosley, the Court has held that
the government may not choose which messages are allowed to be voiced and
heard. See, e.g., Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board could not prevent a non-union speaker
from making a presentation at a public meeting that was called to discuss the
board's labor relations).
74 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
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nized that, although Cohen's jacket was unconventional, the
First Amendment is not limited to protecting only academic
and rational thoughts.7" Therefore, the First Amendment ex-
tended to Cohen's right to express his emotions and feelings
about the war. If, in the interest of shielding individuals from
offensive conduct, Cohen's jacket was not protected, the First
Amendment essentially would be deprived of all value.
The Court did not ignore the privacy interests of those
individuals exposed to Cohen's jacket. Instead, it made clear
that, in the interests of the First Amendment, the observer or
listener is the one who has the burden of "avert[ing] his eyes
or plug[ging] his ears" to avoid lurid messages and "offensive
intrusions which increasingly attend urban life."76
673-74 (1944)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (school regulation prohibiting arm-bands worn in protest of
the Vietnam War was unconstitutional since the school failed to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular viewpoint).
"' Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. In reversing Cohen's conviction, the Court stated
that:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well .... [Wiords are often cho-
sen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanc-
tion the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive con-
tent of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id.
Tribe also discusses the importance of emotive, as well as cognitive, messages
in the context of the civil rights movement during the 1960s. Tribe concludes that
not only did people march and picket to express their discontent because other
modes of expression were prohibited, but these methods of expression were utilized
also "because no other medium could adequately register either the intensity of
their protest or the solidarity of the movement." TRIBE, supra note 16, at 840.
7. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. The Court has been more sensitive to offensive
speech that physically enters the home. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding addressee's statutory right to compel
a mailer of erotic material to remove addressee's name from the mailing list and
stop all future mailings); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordi-
nance proscribing the use of sound trucks in a loud and raucous manner, in part
because an individual in his home cannot escape the intrusion).
In contrast, an individual has an insubstantial privacy right in avoiding of-
fensive expressions in public places, unless the person is unable to leave the situa-
tion without great burden. See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (commuters deemed captives of advertising on
municipally owned buses).
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The tests established by the Court in O'Brien, Clark and
Cohen are at times difficult to reconcile. The Second Circuit
was faced with such difficulties when it considered Loper v.
New York City Police Department. These tests both facilitated
and hindered the Second Circuit's decision.
II. YOUNG V. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY
17
On November 28, 1989, the Legal Action Center for the
Homeless filed a complaint on its own behalf and on behalf of
two indigents, William B. Young and Joseph Walley, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a Transit Authority ("TA") regula-
tion that prohibited panhandling in the New York City subway
system.78 The plaintiffs contended that, because begging was
expressive conduct that deserved the protection of the First
Amendment, the TA should be enjoined from enforcing the
ban.79 The TA argued that the regulation was valid because it
served the state's compelling interest in ensuring safety on the
subway system." On January 25, 1990, the District Court for
77 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). This Comment
pays specific attention to Young apart from the previous background section
because Young has such a significant and direct impact on the analysis and
reasoning of Loper.
"' Id. at 148. Young and Walley were representative plaintiffs for a class of
homeless and needy people who ask for money in the subways of New York City.
The complaint alleged that the regulation that prohibited begging in the subways,
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 § 1050.6. (1989), was violative of the
plaintiffs' first amendment right of freedom of expression. Young, 903 F.2d at 148.
Section 1050.6(b)(2) prohibits all solicitation for charity except by organizations
that "(1) have been licensed for any public solicitation . . . or (2) are duly regis-
tered as charitable organizations." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 §
1050.6(b)(2).
The Transit Authority ("TA") has the power, pursuant to section 1201 of the
New York Public Authority Law, to create "regulations governing passenger con-
duct, in [an effort] to facilitate an effective, safe and reliable means of public
transportation." Id. (citing N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1204(5-a) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1990)).
79 Young, 903 F.2d at 148. The Legal Action Center for the Homeless ("LACH")
primarily argued that begging is expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment since "whenever a homeless . . . person is extending his hand, he is
communicating" within the meaning of the First Amendment. Id.; 903 F.2d at 150.
Moreover, LACH challenged the regulation's distinction between solicitation of
money for charities and solicitation of money for homeless individuals.
"o Id. at 149. In October 1989, in response to complaints about the presence of
beggars in the subway, the TA created "Operation Enforcement," a program aimed
at enforcing the prohibition of begging in the subways. As part of this program,
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the Southern District of New York permanently enjoined the
TA from enforcing the ban on begging and held that begging
constitutes a form of speech meriting the full protection of the
First Amendment."'
On appeal, the Second Circuit framed the issue similarly
to the district court: whether begging constitutes "expressive
conduct" deserving of first amendment protection. 2 In Young,
the majority opinion, written by Judge Altimari, concluded
that begging was not "speech" deserving of first amendment
protection because the only purpose of begging is to convey a
desire for money and there is no particularized message in-
volved. Thus, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
begging sends a message about the economic and social condi-
tions of the homeless and ruled that the ban against begging
was constitutional.'
The majority addressed the distinction between begging
and other types of charitable solicitation. The court held that
the statute's distinction between begging and charitable solici-
tation was justified since organized charitable solicitation
the TA distributed over one million pamphlets that delineated eleven TA rules,
including the "No panhandling or begging" rule. The pamphlets made clear to
readers that those caught begging in the subways would either be arrested, fined
and/or ejected from the subway station. Id.
"' Young, 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). The district court held that there was no distinction
between charitable solicitation, which was allowed under the statute, and panhan-
dling, and therefore begging was protected by the First Amendment. Id. The dis-
trict court relied upon the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), in which the
Court held that organized charitable solicitation constituted a type of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id. The district court held that the protection
afforded to charitable solicitation should extend to begging since there is no practi-
cal distinction between the two activities. Young, 727 F. Supp. at 352.
82 Young, 903 F.2d at 147.
The majority stated that "[t]he only message that we are able to espy as
common to all acts of begging is that beggars want to exact money from those
whom they accost." Id. at 154. The court further noted: "It is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes ... but
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment." Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)).
The court acknowledged that even if a beggar conveys a particularized mes-
sage, thus satisfying the first criteria established in Spence, that conduct still
would fail under Spence because the likelihood that a passenger on the subway
would understand or discern this message from the beggar's conduct is too slim.
Id. at 153.
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serves "community interests by enhancing communication and
disseminating ideas," while begging in the subway "amounts to
nothing less than a menace to the common good."" The court
reasoned that even if panhandling was a form of expressive
conduct within the boundaries of the First Amendment, the
prohibition is still valid since beggars have alternatives-such
as begging in other areas of the city-and the state has a legit-
imate interest in protecting subway riders from the dangers
associated with begging in the confined areas of the subway.'
Judge Meskill's forceful dissent in Young criticized the
majority's distinction between begging and organized charita-
ble solicitation.86 Judge Meskill found that there was no "le-
gally justifiable distinction" between begging for one's self and
solicitation by organized charities.87 Furthermore, he doubted
84 Id. at 156; see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (establishing that the government can "protect its citizens
from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately
be deemed a public nuisance").
8 Young, 903 F.2d at 158. The court characterized the prohibition of begging
in the subways as content-neutral and applied the standard set out in O'Brien to
determine whether the statute was constitutional. Id. at 157-59; see supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text. In applying the four-factor O'Brien test, the court
determined that the TA has a statutory mandate to create laws to ensure the
safety of the trains. The court concluded that the prohibition furthers a substan-
tial governmental interest since so many passengers fear panhandlers and are
dissuaded from using the subway because of the dangers associated with begging,
such as being pushed onto the tracks. Thus the court held that the statute was
justified since the government has a compelling interest in ensuring the safety of
the subways. As to the third O'Brien requirement, the court held that the regula-
tion was unrelated to the suppression of free expression since its goal is to im-
prove the safety of the trains. In labelling the regulation as content-neutral, the
court stated: "Even if begging had no communicative character at all, these inde-
pendent dangers would be just as real, and consequently, there would remain a
substantial governmental interest in prohibiting the conduct in the subway."
Young, 903 F.2d at 159. As to whether the complete ban on begging was neces-
sary to further the government's interests, the court concluded that a total prohibi-
tion was necessary due to the "exigencies created . . . in the subway." Id.
86 Judge Meskill's dissent is integral to any discussion of Young and Loper
since his analysis provides much of the same framework the Second Circuit used
for its analysis in Loper.
'T Id. at 164 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that:
To hold [that begging is distinguishable from charitable solicitation for
first amendment purposes] would mean that an individual's plight is
worthy of less protection in the eyes of the law than the interests ad-
dressed by an organized group. No court has ever so ruled. Defendants
therefore may not open the door to the latter while slamming it in the
face of the former.
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whether the majority correctly applied O'Brien to determine
the constitutionality of the statute, noting that the O'Brien
standard normally is used in cases involving symbolic conduct
rather than speech. Judge Meskill concluded that, since the
government was regulating the beggars' "speech incident to
their solicitation of alms," and not its "symbolic conduct,"
O'Brien was not the correct standard to apply."8 Instead, he
argued that a "time, place and manner" analysis, as set forth
in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, was the
appropriate standard. 9 He also asserted that a complete ban
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest in cur-
tailing the dangers associated with begging, since the regula-
tion prohibited all begging in the subway regardless of whether
it is dangerous or frightening. Judge Meskill noted that the
regulation prohibited aggressive begging, as well as begging by
a "blind man rattling a cup full of change... which would
hardly daunt the average New Yorker."" Thus, a complete
ban placed a greater burden on speech than was necessary and
was therefore unconstitutional.
III. HISTORY OF LOPER V. NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT9'
A. The District Court Decision92
On November 23, 1990, Jennifer Loper and William Kaye,
Id. at 167. Moreover, there was no evidence of record to prove that charitable
solicitation does not create the same problems that begging creates. Id. The
dissent's interpretation of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 629
(1980), differed from the majority's, finding that first amendment protection should
be extended to all charitable solicitation "because a sufficient nexus exists between
a charity's expression of ideas and its fundraising." Young, 903 F.2d at 165.
's 903 F.2d at 166.
8- 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (a regulation of the time, place or manner of an
activity involving conduct intended to be communicative is constitutional where the
regulation is narrowly drawn to further substantial governmental interests and
provided that the interest is unrelated to suppression of free speech).
90 903 F.2d at 168.
91 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
' The district court's decision in Loper is significant because it provides much
of the background for the Second Circuit's affirmance. Additionally, the brevity of
the Second Circuit's decision in Loper makes it imperative to analyze the district
court's decision in Loper to adequately comprehend the Second Circuit's decision.
1994]
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two indigents, filed a class action in the Southern District of
New York. 3 In the complaint, they alleged that the New York
City Police Department's94 enforcement of New York Penal
Law section 240.35(1)" 5 violated the First, Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment. The district court held that section
240.35(1) of the New York Penal Law was unconstitutional in
violation of the first amendment, and determined that the
statute must be invalidated because begging is a form of ex-
pression that deserves first amendment protection.9"
" Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). The plaintiff class consisted "of all those 'needy
persons who live in the State of New York, who beg on the public streets or in
the public parks of New York City,' where a 'needy person' is defined as 'someone
who, because of poverty, is unable to pay for the necessities of life, such as food,
shelter, clothing, medical care, and transportation.'" Id. at 1033. It should be not-
ed that neither party knew the size of the plaintiff class.
9' Summons statistics for the period 1986 to 1992 illustrate that the New York
City Police Department has enforced N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(1) against a signifi-
cant number of persons who are presumably members of the plaintiff class. Loper,
802 F. Supp. at 1033.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the statute should be upheld because
begging has no "expressive element protected by the First Amendment" and that
"even if a speech interest is implicated in Plaintiffs' conduct, the government's
interest in the maintenance of order outweighs the Plaintiffs' interest." Loper, 999
F.2d at 701.
The defendants also contended that Penal Law § 240.35(1) is a necessary tool
to control many of the "evils that are associated with begging." 999 F.2d at 701.
For example, there are instances where panhandlers have blocked people from
walking on the sidewalk, followed people down streets, and threatened those who
refuse to give them money. Id. The defendants espoused the theory that, "unless
stopped, [panhandlers] tend to increase their aggressiveness and ultimately commit
more serious crimes," which inevitably would lead to the destruction of neighbor-
hoods. Id.
"5 Section 240.35(1) provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of loitering
when he loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purposes of
begging." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989). Although there have been
few arrests made pursuant to § 240.35(1), several police officers testified that the
"[s]tatute is used . . . as a source of authority for restricting the Plaintiffs ..
Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1034.
" Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1038. This Comment focuses on the salient question
of whether begging is a form of expression. Professor Tribe rejects the notion that
there is in fact any meaningful distinction between conduct and speech. TRIBE,
supra note 16, at 827. Tribe asserts that all conduct is a form of expression, and
as such concludes that when the Supreme Court bases its decision on a distinction
between speech and conduct, it is actually using a fictitious standard to justify its
conclusion. Id. Tribe states that 'much conduct is expressive .... Expression and
conduct, message and medium, are thus inextricably tied together in all commu-
nicative behavior; expressive behavior is '100% action and 100% expression.'" Id.
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The district court rejected the distinction between begging
and organized charitable solicitation enunciated by the Second
Circuit in Young v. New York City Transit Authority.97 In
Young, the Second Circuit had determined that, although orga-
nized charitable solicitation is protected by the First Amend-
ment because it exposes society to new ideas, begging itself
does not foster such a forum for the exchange of new ideas and
thus can be prohibited." Conversely, the district court in
Loper stressed that there is no substantive difference between
begging and organized charitable solicitation. 9 The court con-
cluded that "[b]oth are charitable acts intended to provide
someone with food, clothing, or shelter.... [Thel message,
though, is the same exact message the homeless beggar con-
veys .... and that message is entitled to First Amendment
protection."'' 0
" See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
9a Young, 903 F.2d at 154. Charitable solicitation is generally protected by the
First Amendment. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980) (Charitable appeals for funds involve a variety of speech interests, including
communication of information and ideas, that are within the protection of the
First Amendment.). The Court in Schaumburg stated that "regulation [of the solici-
tation of financial support] must give due regard to the reality that solicitation is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seek-
ing support for particular causes ... and for the reality that without solicitation
the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease." Id. at 632.
" See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992) (in-person solicitation by a not-for-profit religious corporation was enti-
tled to first amendment protection); David Stoll, Comment, Public Forum Doctrine
Crashes at Kennedy Airport: International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1271 (1993) (discussing how a narrow majority of the Court in
Lee found the airport terminals to be non-public forums).
Through its examination of Lee, which involved a religious sect whose mem-
bers solicited fimds in public places such as airports, the court in Loper concluded
that the solicitation method used by the plaintiffs in Lee was very similar to the
method used by beggars and thus should be entitled to first amendment protec-
tion. Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1037. The court stated that "[b]oth [activities] involve
the face-to-face solicitation of a potentially unsuspecting person walking down the
street." Id.
1" Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1307. The court pointed out one difference between
panhandling and charitable solicitation:
[O]rganized charities . . . 'solicit.' The destitute, however, 'beg' or 'pan-
handle.' In this context, though, the terms are synonymous .... The only
difference in meaning is in the pejorative sense 'begging' is used; that is,
the act of begging has a message associated with it, and that message is
discomforting.
[ . . [Tihe difference between giving a dollar to a homeless beggar, for
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The court interpreted the total ban on begging as a con-
tent-based regulation. The court considered the ban directed at
the actual message begging conveys, and that this message
was one of the few banned in a city overflowing with social,
commercial and political messages.'' The court concluded
that since the regulation is aimed at the "content of a beggar's
expressive conduct,"0 2 the regulation must be invalidated un-
less there is some "over-riding governmental interest. 0 3
The district court in Loper began by criticizing how courts
have approached first amendment and free speech cases, and
suggested that first amendment jurisprudence has become a
cryptic web of tests and criteria.0 4 The court concluded that
example, and the Coalition for the Homeless [organization] is largely
semantic .... This message, though, is the same exact message the
homeless beggar conveys.
Id. (citations omitted); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (1978) (the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source).
101 The court noted:
Walking through New York's Times Square, one is bombarded with mes-
sages. Giant billboards and flashing neon lights dazzle; marquees beckon;
peddlers hawk; preachers beseech; .... One generally encounters a beg-
gar too. Of all these solicitors, though, the only one subject to a blanket
restriction is the beggar.
Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1039; see also supra notes 52-59 (discussing the analysis of
content-based regulations).
102 Id. at 1040.
103 Id.
10 The court in Loper noted:
Courts and commentators often attempt to place First Amendment issues
into neatly carved pigeonholes, from which one is released onto self-exe-
cuting flight paths of analysis. By restricting issues and evoking shibbo-
leths, courts resolve core issues without facing them and ultimately
threaten the conceptual coherence of those First Amendment rights they
are interested in protecting.
Id. at 1038-39. The court also emphasized:
More fundamentally, the fragmentation of the first amendment into a
grab bag of rubrics under which different types of speech receive differ-
ent degrees of protection exemplifies a propensity for pigeonholing as a
method of deciding first amendment questions. Such a method masks the
political dimension of the underlying choices by pretending to cabin judi-
cial discretion within the limits established by the categories themselves.
This sort of pigeonholing endangers the pigeon: if one parses first amend-
ment doctrine too finely, one may soon discover that little protection for
expression remains.
Id. at 1039 n.11 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 16, at 943-44). Other commentators
have also been critical of how courts have dealt with first amendment cases:
[S]o complex has that subspecialty of the free speech clause become that
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to successfully determine the constitutionality of Penal Law
section 240.35(1), it is necessary to balance three interests:'
the speaker's interests, the specific audience's interests, and
the general public's interest. 8
The court first discussed the speaker's interest. The beggar
has a great interest in communicating to the public the person-
al message about the dire homeless situation and in soliciting
money from those who will listen.' The district court per-
ceived this message to be that "social and economic conditions
the graphing of a single libel case now requires a chart that may need
six to eight "fact categories" .
However understandable or benign the cautionary instincts of
the Supreme Court, there must be larger commonalities that cut across
these cases and reduce the field of interesting controversy to more man-
ageable size. And indeed, it turns out that there are. In fact, if one lays
aside the Supreme Court's own caveats that suggest the free speech
clause merely collects smithereens of technical first amendment
subspecialties as in a basket, one may quickly discover that the essential
differences among competing ways of formulating basic first amendment
questions are not numerous at all. Once one sorts out the basic rival
doctrines, they can then be reordered in a sequence that presents all of
their fundamental differences very clearly.
VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 13, at 221-22.
15 The court emphasized that the most important tool in free speech analysis is
the balancing of the interests of society against the interest of the speaker, in a
way that courts have failed to do in the past.
Although bound by the decisions referred to above, this case, and
those that precede it, show that many of the distinctions and tools that
have developed in First Amendment jurisprudence are nothing more than
devices to avoid squarely facing the conflict between the First Amend-
ment and the majoritarian will.... [S]peech distinctions all allow courts
to avoid balancing the majority's will against the First Amendments anti-
majoritarian tenor.
... Any First Amendment issue can be satisfactorily analyzed only if the
demon is openly confronted and exorcised through an application of the
balancing calculus .... Recognizing and grappling with the tension be-
tween the content of speech and the ideas behind it, on the one hand,
and the security and privacy of the individual and society, on the other,
are necessary and true to the Amendment's core.
Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1041-42 (footnotes and citations omitted).
"0 Id. at 1042. The court defined the general public as "those members of the
general public who are not part of the audience but nonetheless may be affected,
directly or indirectly, by the speaker's act of expression." Id. at 1045. The court
noted that there is also a fourth interest involved, that of the government in en-
suring all three interests. Id. at 1042.
107 Id.
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and opportunities and governmental services are such that
many people are unable to support themselves and must rely
on the freely given alms of others in order to eke out an exis-
tence.""8 The court concluded that this is a "genuine and le-
gitimate interest"-a beggar has the right to communicate to
the public.' 9
The court then balanced the beggar's interest with the
audience's interest, which has two distinct parts. The first is
the audience's right to be educated and have information readi-
ly available to it."0 The second is the audience's right to pri-
vacy and to be left alone so that individuals can "enjoy public
facilities without interference" by the unpleasant pleas of the
homeless."' The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Cohen v. California". in deciding that the
beggar's interest outweighs the audience's interest in this situ-
ation."8 Since the beggars did not invade society's substan-
tial privacy interests in an intolerable manner, the statute was
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. The court in Loper
emphasized that although society has the burden to protect the
citizens from "any offense that the expressive act of begging
may give rise to .... The burden is not upon the state to pro-
tect the audience by enforcing a blanket restriction on this
kind of speech.""
The third goal of the First Amendment to be considered is
the general public's interests to be free from the dangers asso-
ciated with begging-such as aggressive panhandling, the
108 Id.
109 Id.
... Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1042. The court stated: "The First Amendment pro-
tects and promotes this interest [of the public] by fostering a climate in which
information can flow freely from speakers to whom the listener can turn when she
is in need of information." Id.
111 Id.
' 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
113 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1043. The court in Loper implies that, much like the
pedestrians in Loper, the people in Cohen were not trapped in the courthouse and
were not forced to look at Cohen's jacket; they simply could have averted their
eyes. The court analogized the pedestrians to the people in the courthouse and
justified its decision by noting that citizens on the street can escape the possible
offensiveness of begging by walking away from the beggar. Id. at 1044.
114 Id. at 1045. The Supreme Court has held that in most cases involving po-
tentially offensive speech or conduct, the burden of protecting first amendment
interests falls on the viewer, not the speaker or actor. Id.
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disruption of traffic and the interference with commercial es-
tablishments"--and freedom from the fear of disorder,
which may proliferate as a result of begging."6 In addressing
these two interests, the court held that Penal Law section
240.35(1) was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. As to
whether the ban on begging curtails the dangers associated
with such conduct, the court held that the ban was too broad
since alternative ways existed to minimize dangers associated
with begging."' For example, other sections of the New York
Penal Law could be used to prevent some of these dangers.
Penal Law section 240.2(5) states that a "person is guilty of
disorderly conduct when obstructing vehicular or pedestrian
traffic."18
As to whether a total ban is necessary to curb the fear
begging creates, the court held that a total ban is unjustified
since not all begging intimidates people or creates a
disincentive for people to travel in certain areas of the city.
The court stressed that although citizens are sometimes of-
fended by the message that begging conveys, "the answer is
not in criminalizing those people, . . . but [in] addressing the
root cause of their existence. The root cause is not served by
removing them from sight; however, society is then just able to
pretend they do not exist a little longer." 9
After the court balanced the three interests, the court
struck down the anti-begging statute as an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment. 20 The court held that
115 Id.
116 Id. In arguing that begging should not be protected by the First Amend-
ment, the defendants in Loper relied on the expert testimony of Professor George
Kelling, who stressed that "beggars and panhandlers indicate to society that disor-
der has set in. A neighborhood with such people, in which there are broken win-
dows, drug dealers, and youth gangs is threatening to the society precisely because
of the indication of disorder." Id. at 1034.
117 Id. at 1046.
1 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.2(5) (McKinney 1989).
.19 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1046. In dictum, the court stated that a narrower
ban on begging aimed at limiting the dangers associated with begging may be
constitutional. Id.
1. The court recognized the government's interest in limiting the fear and para-
noia created by panhandling. The court stressed, however, that the offensiveness of
panhandling is not enough to justify a total ban. The court concluded that "[If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive and disagreeable." Id. at 1047 (citing Texas v. Johnson,
1994]
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when people leave the privacy of the home, inevitably they are
going to be confronted with messages and conduct that they
find offensive but that people must learn to tolerate these
disturbing messages in certain circumstances, such as when
they are in public places. This is the "trade-off" and sacrifice
that individuals must make when they leave their homes and
enter a world in which other people may have conflicting view-
points.
121
B. The Second Circuit Decision
On July 29, 1993, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that struck down section 240.35(1) of the New
York Penal Law. 2 Consistent with the district court's deci-
sion, the Second Circuit came to the critical conclusion that
begging does implicate expressive conduct and communicative
activity deserving of first amendment protection. 2  The Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that begging, whether or not accompa-
nied by verbal speech, involves communication of a specific
message that conveys the "need for food, shelter [and] cloth-
ing."" The court concluded that begging, like organized char-
itable solicitation, is expression meriting first amendment pro-
tection.1
25
The court characterized the streets of New York as a tradi-
tional public forum.12 Government property that is tradition-
121 Id. at 1047.
When leaving the insular security of one's home and becoming a partici-
pant in the world organized by society, one interacts with its elements.
This necessarily includes those who have different viewpoints and back-
grounds. Paying attention is not a requirement.... [Uf the disturbing
message has substance, the hope is it will be heeded in due time, and
society strengthened through resilience, not rigidity.
Id. Thus, although the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the
public, the "interest in permitting free speech and the message begging sends
about our society predominates." Id.
12 Loper, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
1 3 Id. at 704.
124 Id.
1 Id. at 704. Similar to the district court, the Second Circuit relied on
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), which struck
down an ordinance that prohibited solicitation by charitable organizations that did
not use at least 75% of their revenues for charitable purposes. See supra note 98
and accompanying text.
... Loper, 999 F.2d at 703. Because the streets and sidewalks of New York City
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ally available for public expression" ' is considered a public
forum, and any government regulation of speech taking place
on a public forum will be "subject to the highest scrutiny." '8
Generally, the government may not proscribe any communica-
tive activity in a public forum.'2 9 However, before the govern-
ment may enforce a partial ban based on the content of the
speech, it must demonstrate that the regulation both is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn
to achieve such an end.'30 The defendants in Loper failed to
satisfy this standard because, regardless of whether the state
had a compelling interest in prohibiting begging, a total ban is
not narrowly tailored to achieve that end. A total ban would
leave beggars with no alternative means of expressing them-
selves; in effect, the ban would force them to silence their mes-
sage.' 31
The Loper court also stressed that Penal Law section
fall into the category of public property traditionally held open to the public for
expressive activity, they are public fora. Id. at 704.
27 Property owned by the government that usually is considered public fora
"includes streets and parks, which are said to 'have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public.'" Loper, 999 F.2d at 703 (quoting Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
' International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2705 (1992) (a regulation prohibiting solicitation of funds in airline terminals oper-
ated by a public authority did not violate the First Amendment since the termi-
nals were nonpublic fora and the regulation reasonably limited solicitation); cf.
Stoll, supra note 99, at 1271 (discussing how "consistent throughout the early
cases involving government property was an attempt by the Court to balance a
desire to accommodate uninhibited speech, which is critical to a free society,
against the need for the efficient operation of government").
1" Loper, 999 F.2d at 703. But see Stoll, supra note 99, at 1275 ("a microscopic
analysis of the various Court approaches reveals that the First Amendment contin-
ues to afford little protection to speakers on public property").
In addition to public fora and private fora, there is another type of forum
called the "designated public forum." This type is a forum that is specifically des-
ignated by the government as a limited public forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). A government regulation of speech
on a designated public forum is subject to the same level of scrutiny used to eval-
uate regulations on public fora. Id.
13' Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (in traditional public fora such as public streets and
parks, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity and to enforce
a content-based exclusion the state "must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end").
131 Loper, 999 F.2d at 705. The court stated that the regulation "does not leave
open alternative channels of communication by which beggars can convey their
messages of indigency." Id.
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240.35(1) failed to advance any substantial and important
governmental interests. The court found no real distinction
between the prohibited acts of beggars and the sanctioned
solicitation by organized charities.132 The court concluded:
"[clertainly, a member of a charitable, religious or other orga-
nization who seeks alms for the organization and is also, as a
member, a beneficiary of those alms should be treated no dif-
ferently from one who begs for his or her account."133 Fur-
thermore, the court found that the government interests served
by a ban on begging could be addressed by other penal law sec-
tions.'34
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRcUrT'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO
JUSTIFY LOPER
A. The Second Circuit's Effort to Distinguish Young from
Loper
In invalidating Penal Law section 240.35(1) without over-
132 Id. The court concluded that the total ban:
in no way advances substantial and important governmental interests. If
it did, the State would not allow, as it does, the solicitation of contri-
butions on city streets by individuals who represent charitable organi-
zations . . . . If individuals may solicit for charitable and other organiza-
tions, no significant governmental interest is served by prohibiting others
for soliciting for themselves.
Id. (citations omitted).
1 Id.; see also Charles F. Knapp, Comment, Statutory Restriction of Panhan-
dling in Light of Young v. New York City Transit: Are States Begging Out of First
Amendment Proscriptions?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 405, 416 (1991).
134 For example, laws forbidding harassment and disorderly conduct may apply.
Harassment in the first degree is committed when one "follow[s] another person in
or about a public place . . .or . .. repeatedly commit[s] act[s] which place[ I such
person in reasonable fear of physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney
Supp. 1994). Disorderly conduct is committed when one, "With intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm .. .uses abusive or obscene language or
obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(3), (5)
(McKinney 1989). Fraudulent accosting is committed when one "accosts a person in
a public place with intent to defraud [that person] of money." N.Y. PENAL LAW §
165.30(1) (McKinney 1989). Menacing in the third degree is committed by one
"who, by physical menace, intentionally places or attempts to place another person
in fear of physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.15 (McKinney Supp. 1993). The
court suggested that all of these sections could have adequately redressed the
same dangers that § 240.35(1) seeks to prevent. The court noted that the above
statutes prohibit conduct, whereas § 240.35(1) prohibits speech as well as conduct
of a communicative nature. Loper, 999 F.2d at 702.
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turning Young, the Loper opinion contained two separate,
inconsistent sections. The first section discussed the factual
distinctions between the two regulations, 3 ' and concluded
that Penal Law section 240.35(1) must be struck down due to
its broad territorial scope. The second section espoused the
idea that begging is expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment since it sends a message "of need for support and
assistance." 8' Although Loper superficially resolved the ques-
tion of whether begging is protected by the First Amendment,
the court was unclear about whether it overruled Young and,
therefore, contributes further to the quagmire of free speech
cases. Loper left the public with an unsettled, tenuous prin-
ciple that will lead to litigation involving parties who are un-
sure whether begging implicates expressive conduct meriting
first amendment protection.
In the first section of Loper, the Second Circuit factually
distinguished the penal law provision involved from the Tran-
sit Authority regulation at issue in Young. The court in Loper
emphasized that the TA regulation challenged in Young was
constitutional because it furthered the state's substantial and
important interest in curtailing the particular dangers associ-
ated with the isolated environment of the subway system."'
Summarizing its Young decision, the court in Loper stated
that: "We [found] that.., begging in the.., atmosphere of the
subway 'disrupts and startles' passengers, thus creating the
potential for a serious accident in the fast-moving and crowded
subway environment."'38 The Loper court emphasized that
the ban on panhandling in the subway was permissible be-
cause it left open alternative channels of communication." 9
" See supra note 79 for the regulation upheld in Young and supra note 2 for
the regulation struck down in Loper.
136 Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
" 999 F.2d at 702 (emphasis added).
... Id. (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 158).
... Id. at 702. In appreciation of the similarities between Loper and Young, the
court in Loper noted its previous statement that "[ulnder the [TA] regulation,
begging is prohibited only in the subway, not throughout all of New York City. It
is untenable to suggest ... that absent the opportunity to beg and panhandle in
the subway system, [beggars] are left with no means to communicate to the public
about needy persons." Id. at 702 (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 160). The court al-
luded to the fact that, in Young, it already had been drawing a distinction be-
tween a limited ban and a total ban, coming to the conclusion that the former is
permissive while the latter is unconstitutional due to their respective scopes. Id.
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The Loper court further distinguished the cases challeng-
ing a total ban from those of a partial ban based on an analy-
sis of the forums involved. The court characterized the side-
walks of New York City as "public property traditionally held
open to the public for expressive activity."'4 In contrast, the
Second Circuit in Young had characterized the subway system
as a limited public forum.' The Young court had relied on
the reasoning of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority,' in which the Sec-
ond Circuit held that a subway is not a traditional or designat-
ed public forum.'43
The Loper court's reasoning becomes particularly prob-
lematic in the second section of its opinion, where the court
contradicted its earlier conclusion in Young-that begging is
not a form of expressive conduct'--and held that begging
does constitute communicative activity protected by the First
Amendment. In contrast to its holding in Young, the court in
Loper extended the reasoning of Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment'45 to panhandling. The Su-
preme Court in Schaumburg held that organized charitable
solicitation constituted a form of speech meriting first amend-
ment protection. 46 In Young, the Second Circuit found a crit-
ical distinction between organized charitable solicitation and
... Id. at 704; see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)
(sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Supreme Court grounds are
indistinguishable from other sidewalks in Washington D.C. and constitute a proper
public forum).
14 Young, 903 F.2d at 162.
14. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
"' 745 F.2d at 772-73; see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) ("it is the nature of the forum
that we must examine in order to determine the extent to which expressive activi-
ty may be regulated"); Stoll, supra note 99, at 1403.
14 Loper, 999 F.2d at 704. The court in Young concluded that "the conduct of
begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to nothing less than a menace to
the common good." Young, 903 F.2d at 156 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)).
Note that the court's conclusion in Loper, that begging is a form of expressive
conduct, is not determinative of whether begging is protected by the First Amend-
ment. The court first determined that begging is within the universe of "speech"
that the First Amendment implicates; the court then went on to analyze whether
this "speech" actually is protected by the First Amendment in this context.
145 444 U.S. 620 (1980); see supra note 82.
14' 444 U.S. at 639.
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panhandling: the former serves the legitimate purpose of com-
municating new ideas, while the latter has little, if any, soci-
etal value. 47 In contrast, in Loper the court recognized no
significant free speech difference between begging and orga-
nized charitable solicitation.'48 The court in Loper empha-
sized that a regulation that allows charitable organizations to
solicit yet proscribes begging for oneself serves no governmen-
tal interest.'49
In reaching its conclusion in Loper, the Second Circuit
ignored its previous determination in Young. In concluding
that begging is a form of expressive conduct, the Loper court
stated:
While we indicated in Young that begging does not always involve
the transmission of a particularized message, it seems certain that it
usually involves some communication of that nature. Begging fre-
quently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for food, shel-
ter, clothing, medical care or transportation. Even without particu-
larized speech, however, the presence of an unkempt and disheveled
person holding out his or her hand or cup to receive a donation itself
conveys a message of need for support and assistance. We see little
difference between those who solicit for organized charities and those
who solicit for themselves in regard to the message conveyed....
Both solicit the charity of others. The distinction is not a significant
one for First Amendment purposes."'
The above reasoning is antithetical to what the court held in
Young.15" ' The court in Loper has essentially determined that
begging is a form of conduct that, in and of itself, speaks about
the economic and social conditions of the homeless. In contrast
to its determination in Young, the court in Loper concluded
that the mere presence of a homeless person sends a message
warranting first amendment protection because it educates
17 Young, 903 F.2d at 156. In rejecting the extension of Schaumburg to beg-
ging, the court in Young held that "Schaumburg... [does not] stand for the
proposition that begging and panhandling are protected speech under the First
Amendment. Rather [it] hold[s] that there is a sufficient nexus between solicitation
by organized charities and a 'variety of speech interests' to invoke the protection
under the First Amendment." Id. at 155.
1 Loper, 999 F.2d at 704-05.
19 Id. at 705.
11 Id. at 704 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
... The court in Young concluded: "We . . . express[ ] grave doubt as to wheth-
er begging and panhandling in the subway are sufficiently imbued with communi-
cation character to justify constitutional protection." 903 F.2d at 153.
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individuals about the personal needs of the homeless.152
B. Begging Sends a Valuable and Particularized Message
Although the Second Circuit did not reach a decision that
accorded with its precedent, it did reach a principled conclu-
sion. Loper correctly held that begging is a form of expressive
conduct that merits first amendment protection153 since the
conduct of begging satisfies the standard set out in Spence v.
State of Washington.54 Begging satisfies the first criteria of
Spence. Begging sends a "particularized message;" it conveys
the inherent message of economic need. Although a beggar
might not always be overtly aware that her activity sends a
message about the economic, social and political conditions of
the homeless, subconsciously the beggar knows that this activi-
ty is indicative of economic stratification in the United States.
The Supreme Court has held that as long as the actor intends
to convey a message that is understood by its recipients, the
conduct is protected by the First Amendment.'
Begging also satisfies the second criteria of the Spence test
because of the great likelihood that the recipient of the mes-
sage (the listener) will understand the beggar's message. When
a person sees a beggar on the street, that person knows that
the beggar illustrates the seriousness of the homeless problem.
Although many individuals ignore beggars or scorn their mes-
sage, these individuals are still conscious of the message being
conveyed. A recipient of a beggar's plea cannot help but realize
that the beggar's very existence demonstrates that the home-
less problem is not being sufficiently rectified.
In the context of expressive conduct, begging is analogous
to other activities that have been held to be protected by the
First Amendment. For example in Texas v. Johnson5 ' the
Supreme Court struck down a flag desecration statute since it
was aimed at expressive conduct that implicated first amend-
12 Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
" Although this Comment criticizes the court's lack of explanation for its shift
in position in Young, this Comment agrees with the court's conclusion that begging
is conduct protected by the First Amendment.
.. 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
M5 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
166 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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ment protection. The court determined that flag burning sends
an implicit message of political dissatisfaction." 7 Begging
and flag desecration should be considered similar conduct in
the context of the First Amendment. Initially it appears that
neither act merits first amendment protection since "speech" in
the traditional sense-that is, the oral or written word-is not
involved. Applying the Spence criteria, however, it is apparent
that both begging and flag desecration fall within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment since both activities send a par-
ticularized message to viewers who are more than likely to
understand the message.
These two activities are also similar because both encom-
pass the interests and goals that the First Amendment seeks
to protect. The Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson was con-
cerned with giving citizens the opportunity to express their
dissatisfaction with the government. The Court noted that its
precedents demonstrate that a primary "function of free
157 491 U.S. at 409. In Johnson, the state had argued that allowing flag dese-
cration will lead to increased disdain and disloyalty to the United States. The
state argued that Johnson's activity would incite violence and that the regulation
was justified since flag desecration carried with it the potential for a breach of
peace. The Court held that expression that may offend an audience does not nec-
essarily create the potential for disturbing the peace. Id.; see also Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988) ("graphic depictions and satirical
cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate... . From
the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been
considerably poorer without them."); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971)
("The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make criminal
the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be 'annoying'
to some people."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1969) ("[Olur history says that it is this sort of hazardous free-
dom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively per-
missive, often disputatious, society.").
In further rejecting the state's argument that flag burning would lead to
violence, the Court in Johnson stated:
We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place
in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding
today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and
inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our
toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our
strength. . . . It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas
sees reflected in the flag-and it is that resilience that we reassert to-
day ... The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish
those who feel differently about these matters.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
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speech... is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger."5 ' Although begging may not "invite dispute" in the
literal sense, begging, similar to flag desecration, serves the
important first amendment function of allowing political and
social debate.'59
Another Supreme Court decision illustrating the similari-
ties between begging and other protected first amendment
activities is Brown v. Louisiana.' Brown involved five Afri-
can American men who, for the purpose of manifesting silent
protest against a segregated library, entered the public room of
the library and remained there for several minutes, despite the
librarian's plea for them to exit the building. The men were
subsequently arrested for violation of a Louisiana breach of
peace statute. 6' In Brown, the Court pointed out that it has
repeatedly held that first amendment rights are not "confined
to verbal expression" and that these rights "embrace appropri-
ate types of action which certainly include the right in a peace-
able and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful
presence,. in a place where the protestant has every right to
be.""'62 Begging is similar to the protected activity in Brown
because, as a form of protest against the inequities faced by
beggars; begging is analogous to "protest by ... reproachful
presence."
Through applying the analysis employed in cases such as
158 491 U.S. at 408-09.
... See supra notes 27-32.
160 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
161 The statute made it a crime, "'with intent to provoke a breach of peace, or
under circumstances such that a breach of peace may be occasioned thereby[,]' to
crowd or congregate in a public building and fail or refuse to disperse or move on
when ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer or other authorized person."
Id.
162 Brown, 383 U.S. at 142; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29
(1963) (litigation is "a form of political expression" and activities related to such
litigation are "modes of expression and association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931) ("Thus it was said that the clause 'might be construed to include
the peaceful and orderly opposition to a government . . ").
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Texas v. Johnson and Brown v. Louisiana, it becomes evident
that the Second Circuit in Loper accurately labeled begging as
expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amend-
ment. Similar to burning the American flag or wearing an
arm-band to protest of the Vietnam war, begging expresses the
actor's personal views towards an issue or concept that is im-
portant to him. The very core of the First Amendment would
be destroyed if the beggar's message could not be expressed. If
the beggar's message were suppressed, it would be damaging
to both the beggar and to individuals in society who would be
deprived of exposure to a wide array of messages.
C. Loper was Correctly Decided Since Begging Furthers the
Interests Promoted by the First Amendment
Begging furthers the interests courts examine when deter-
mining whether conduct is protected by the First Amendment
and, as such, it is crucial for it to be protected by the First
Amendment.'63 One of the primary goals of the First Amend-
ment is to expose all individuals to a myriad of ideas and opin-
ions."M It is imperative therefore that society is well informed
about the varying economic and social conditions that exist in
this country. This includes being adequately aware of the con-
dition of the homeless. Begging enlightens society about the
pervasiveness of the country's homeless problem.'65 If indi-
16 See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text for discussion concerning the
three interests and factors courts take into consideration when analyzing free
speech cases.
16 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
' Even if a beggar does not say anything specific about her living conditions,
her presence in and of itself conveys a truthful message to society about how
certain members of society are living. Begging forces people to realize and face the
unpleasant notion that many people in today's society are starving and helpless.
This Comment proposes that although some begging conveys a distasteful and
pessimistic message about society, every member of society, whether wealthy or
poor, has the responsibility to, at the very least, be aware of the conditions of the
homeless.
Although some may argue that the enlightening value of begging is too subtle
to be significant, "'the First Amendment protects more than elite speech,' [because]
it is necessary to protect a varied dissemination of ideas to ensure that society is
adequately enlightened." CHAFEE JR., supra note 15, at 31; see also Citizen Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969) (the First Amendment
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
1994]
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viduals are deprived of information concerning this acute prob-
lem, a primary purpose of the First Amendment would be de-
feated.
166
Begging also promotes the values of a democratic system.
Begging allows the homeless, a significant population of soci-
ety,6 7 to express their views about their personal situation
lic.. . ." (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
" John Stuart Mill asserted that society would be detrimentally uninformed if
individuals were not exposed to ideas with which they may not agree. Mill con-
tended that
[tihe greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he
always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still great-
er, intensity tha4 even his own. . . . He who knows only his own side
of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one
may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute
the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what
they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.... He must be
able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; . . . else he
will never really possess himself in the portion of truth which meets and
removes that difficulty.
MILL, supra note 20, at 51-52.
16 See supra note 1. It is equally as important for the homeless to participate
in the political process as it is for wealthier classes. Due to their lack of resourc-
es, one of the only ways a beggar can participate in the political process is
through communicating her need for food and money;, begging, in fact, is analogous
to voting in that both express the actor's views towards the government.
Alexander Meiklejohn emphasizes the role the First Amendment plays in edu-
cating all individuals in society about the political process and one's political choic-
es. He contends that the voter must be exposed to a wide array of ideas and
opinions to make a well-informed decision at the polls. In discussing the various
goals of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn states that:
IT]here are many forms of thought and expression within the range of
human communications from which the voter derives the knowledge,
intelligence, sensitivity to human values .... These, too, must suffer no
abridgement of their freedom....
. . . Education, . . . is the attempt to so inform and cultivate the
mind and will of a citizen that he shall have the wisdom, the indepen-
dence, and, therefore the dignity of a governing citizen....
• . . Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading
of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged by our agents. Though [the state] govern[s] us, we, in a deep-
er sense, govern them. Over our governing, they have no power. Over
their governing we have sovereign power.
TEACHER OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 250.
The freedom to beg is analogous to the freedom to vote in that both activities
are demonstrative of the thoughts, opinions and concerns that exist in the beggar's
or voter's mind. At the same time, the freedom of a beggar to express convictions
about his economic and social condition further educates voters and allows them to
become the intelligent and independent citizens. As the Supreme Court has noted:
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and comment on the performance of elected officials. Since
many homeless people lack the resources and capabilities to
speak to their political representatives, panhandling provides
one of the only mediums to express their political opinions;
begging is one of the sole avenues for the homeless to partici-
pate in the political process and to express their pain, frustra-
tion and anger about their living conditions. If the homeless
are deprived of the freedom to express themselves, the First
Amendment's purpose of facilitating a democratic system and
self-realization will be thwarted.
Begging also promotes the interests advocated by the First
Amendment because it exposes politicians to first-hand knowl-
edge of the homeless problem. Although many beggars are
critical of the government's policies, critical opinions are very
valuable to society and policymakers.'68 Public officials know,
or should know, that many members of society empathize with
the homeless and are watching the politicians respond to their
problem. It is essential to the democratic process that public
officials be exposed to the beggar's message since the message
highlights the problems of current social and economic policies.
Although ignoring the homeless may be a satisfactory solution
to some, this is a short-term and inadequate method of ad-
dressing the problem. The presence of begging serves as an
impetus to force policymakers to decide what type of legislation
needs to be promulgated to rectify the homeless problem. 9
Though numerically significant, the homeless are politically powerless
inasmuch as they lack the financial resources necessary to obtain access
to many of the most effective means of persuasion. Moreover, homeless
persons are likely to be denied access to the vote since the lack of mail-
ing address or other proof of residence within a State disqualifies an
otherwise eligible citizen from registering to vote.
Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 n.4 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
1" A message does not need to be of high intellectual caliber to be protected by
the First Amendment. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court held
that:
We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privi-
lege, these fundamental societal values are fully implicated. That is why
'[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech
as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons.'
Id. at 25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
528 (1948)).
"6 Our society, founded on the principle of individualism, is faced with the
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D. Loper Aggravates an Already Complicated Area of Free
Speech Cases
Loper has further complicated the area of free speech cases
since the Second Circuit has shifted its position towards the
expressive nature of begging without acknowledging its devia-
tion from its prior position. The Loper decision presents society
with the arduous task of discerning whether begging will be
interpreted as expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment in future cases. It is insufficient for the Second
Circuit to justify Loper simply by pointing to the totality of
Penal Law section 240.35(1).17o Rather, the Second Circuit
should provide constructive and useful guidance to ensure that
lower courts, as well as society, have a fairly intelligible idea
whether and in what circumstances begging will be protected
by the First Amendment. The Loper court's failure to justify its
shift away from Young has serious implications, particularly as
more states enact anti-panhandling statutes.'
Another detrimental aspect to the Second Circuit's decision
in Loper is the court's blatant disregard of precedent and stare
decisis. The court's decision runs afoul of the principle that in-
structs courts to adhere to past precedent' and previously
question of whether the public has the duty to ensure the survival of others. The
theory of individualism, supported by many members of society, is the notion that
citizens do not have any duty to help others survive; everyone is responsible for
themselves and their own sustenance. Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging
to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 897
(1991).
Another commentator asserts that every individual in society has a legitimate
claim to economic security and "communal resources for bare subsistence." MI-
CHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 79 (1983). Walzer argues that "[n]o commu-
nity can allow its members to starve to death when there is food available to feed
them; no government can stand passively by at such a time-not if it claims to be
a government of or by or for the community." Id.
170 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
. In light of the proliferation of anti-panhandling statutes, it is unfortunate
that the Second Circuit has failed to provide adequate guidelines for analyzing the
constitutionality of these statutes. Although it would have been a difficult and
challenging task, the Second Circuit should have at least discussed how a court
should analyze whether a particular anti-begging statute was violative of the First
Amendment.
... Precedent is defined as "[an adjudged case or decision of a court, considered
as furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards
arising on a similar question of law .... Prior cases which are close in facts or
legal principles to the case under consideration are called precedents." BLACK'S
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decided principles of law.7 ' Rather than creating a consistent
and reliable standard of determining when begging is protected
by the First Amendment, the court has intensified the already
entangled web of free speech cases.7 By creating one princi-
ple in Young, and contradicting this principle three years later
in Loper, the Second Circuit has failed to reconcile whether the
"mere presence" of a homeless person is conduct protected by
the First Amendment.'75  The aftermath of the Second
Circuit's decision in Loper exemplifies the very characteristics
that stare decisis and precedent seek to avoid. Without guid-
ance from the Second Circuit, it is likely that both courts and
citizens will feel uncomfortable and unsatisfied with the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Loper.7 s
LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
... Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986); see also Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process."); Michael Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 84 (1991) ("[B]ecause the
Court is a critical interpreter of and a player in historical events, its precedents
preserve, illuminate and provide a perspective on the nation's social, political and
legal traditions."). But see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (when past
decisions are poorly reasoned or unworkable "this Court has never felt constrained
to follow precedent"); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (stare decisis
is not an "inexorable command," but rather a "principle of policy and not a me-
chanical formula of adherence to the latest decision").
174 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. There is already a myriad of
categorical tests and standards employed to discern whether certain conduct im-
plicates enough of a speech interest to bring it within the protection of the First
Amendment.
17 The result of overturning precedent is "chaos, lack of certainty regarding the
durability of a number of individual freedoms, and/or proof positive that constitu-
tional law is nothing more than politics carried on in a different forum." Gerhardt,
supra note 176, at 70.
17 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 173, at 77. Gerhardt addresses the public's
reaction when the Supreme Court decides to follow firmly established precedent.
He states: "The public is more likely to retain confidence in the impartiality and
consistency of the Court's decisionmaking if the reasons for the Court's choices are
persuasive and if the Court generally adheres to principles that will reliably safe-
guard popular precedents." Id. Possibly, the Second Circuit's decision in Loper is
the inevitable result of constitutional decision-making. Despite the importance of
adhering to long-established precedent, numerous Supreme Court decisions in the
area of individual rights either have been overruled, or narrowly distinguished. See
id. at 98. Although this practice creates uncertainty about individual rights, the
area of individual freedoms is so imbued with political and social influences that it
is sometimes arduous for courts to reconcile certain distinctions and ambiguous
shifts.
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CONCLUSION
Despite Loper, the Second Circuit has not definitively
answered the question of whether panhandling is expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Due to the court's
lack of analytical justification for its shift toward such protec-
tion, it remains unclear what the result would be if a similar
ban on begging was presented to either the Second Circuit or
the Supreme Court for review. It is imperative that courts
ensure that begging receives first amendment protection be-
cause society should be exposed to a beggar's message. Al-
though it is not each individual's personal responsibility to en-
sure the livelihood of the homeless, society should be exposed
to the important and socially informative message that begging
sends. Elena W. Slipp
